[ 苏洁澈 ]——(2013-10-24) / 已阅25302次
[25]P. R. Wood, Principles of International Insolvency, p.742.
[26]P. R. Wood, Principles of International Insolvency, p. 408.
[27]E. H. Hupkes, Special Bank Resolution and Shareholders’Rights: Balancing Competing Interests, p.23; A. Campbell&P Cartwright, Banks in Crisis: The Legal Response,pp. 126-128.
[28]S. 99 of the Banking Act 2009;R. Tomasic, “Creating a Template for Banking Insolvency Law Reform after the Collapse of Northern Rock Part 2” (2009) 22 Insolvency Intelligence 83;E. Avgouleas, “ Banking Supervision and the Special Resolu-tion Regime of the Banking Act 2009:the Unfinished Reform” (2009) 4(2) Capital Markets Law Journal 224.
[29]British Bankers’ Association Response to the Tripartite Discussion Paper: Banking Reform-Protecting Depositors, p. 11,ht-tp://www. bba. org. uk/content/1/c6/01/16/48/BBA_Response_to_Tripartite_DP_-_Banking-Reform. pdf,访问时间:2013年1月15日。
[30]美国“联邦存款保险公司”的某些监管性决定可以不举行听证,也不受司法审查。许多东欧国家的银行法也有类似的规定。Art. 21 (5) of the Banks Act 1997 ( Bulgaria);G. A. Gegenheimer, “Judicial Review of Bank Supervisory Deci-sions in the Former Soviet Republics: The Case of Kyrgyzstan” (2006) 25 Annual Review of Banking&Financial Law 249.
[31]Yuen Kun Yen v. AG of Hong Kong[1988] AC 175,185;Three Rivers D. C v. Bank of England [2000] 2 W. L. R. 15;Franklin Savings Corp. v. U. S,385 F. 3d 1279 , (10th Cir 2004).关于金融监管机构的侵权责任制度,参见苏洁澈:《论银行监管机构侵权责任—以银行破产和英美法为例》,《法学家》2011年第1期。
[32]有学者认为,监管机构经常出于自身政治利益考量,而延迟关闭问题银行。J. R. Macey & G. P. Miller, “Kaye, Scho-ler, FIRREA, and The Desirability of Early Closure: A View of the Kaye, Scholer Case from the Perspective of Bank Regu-latory Policy”(1993)66 Southern California Law Review 1133.
[33]P. P. Swire, “Bank Insolvency Law Now that It Matters Again”,p.477.
[34]P. P. Swire, “Bank Insolvency Law Now that It Matters Again” ,p.523.
[35]J. R. Macey, G. P. Miller&R. S. Carnell, Banking Law and Regulation, Aspen Law&Business, 2001,p. 307;D. G.Mayes,“ Some Rules for Cross-border Banks in Europe” (2009) 10 European Business Organization Law Review 213.
[36]P. P. Swire, “Bank Insolvency Law Now that It Matters Again”,p.488.
[37]G. N. Olson, “Government Intervention: the Inadequacy of Bank Insolvency Resolution-Lesson from the American Experi-ence”,in R. M. Lastra&H. N. Schiffman(eds.),Bank Failures and Bank Insolvency Law in Economies in Transition,Kluwer, 1999,p.111.
[38]G. N. Olson, “Government Intervention: the Inadequacy of Bank Insolvency Resolution-Lesson from the American Experi-ence”.p.115.
[39]J. R. Macey, “Winstar, Bureaucracy and Public Choice”(1998) 6 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 268.
[40]D. A. Skeel, “The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regulation”(1998) 76 Texas Law Review 729.
[41]H. M. Schooner,“Bank Insolvency Regimes in the United States and the United Kingdom” (2005)18 The Transnational Lawyer 389.
[42]G. N. Olson, “Government Intervention: the Inadequacy of Bank Insolvency Resolution-Lesson from the American Experi-ence”,p.114.
[43]M. H. Krimminger, “Deposit Insurance and Bank Insolvency in a Changing World: Synergies and Challenges”,IMF Confer-ence, May 28, 2004, http://imf. org/external/np/leg/sem/2004/cdmfl/eng/mk. pdf,访问时间:2012年10月30日。
[44]H. Jackson, “The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies”(1994) 107 Harvard Law Review 507,508-532;关于母公司与子公司的责任问题研究,见余劲松:《跨国公司法律问题专论》,法律出版社2008年版。
[45]H. Jackson, “The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies” ,p. 529;G. N. Olson,“Government Interven-tion: the Inadequacy of Bank Insolvency Resolution-Lesson from the American Experience”,p.114.
[46]M. H. Krimminger, “Deposit Insurance and Bank Insolvency in a Changing World: Synergies and Challenges' .
[47]FDICv.Roldan Fonseca, 795 F.2d 1102, 1109 (1st Cir.1986).
[48]Notes, “Creditors’ Remedies Against the FDIC as Receiver of a Failed National Bank”(1986) 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1440;How-ell v. FDIC, 986 F. 2d 569 574(1 st Cir. 1993 ).
[49]FDIC v. Ernst&Young, 374 F 3d 579,582 (7th Cir.2004).
[50]为刺激经济增长,央行长期维持低息政策,从而鼓励了银行的过度放贷;而监管机构则为了避免储蓄机构的破产,修改了通行的会计准则,这导致了大量本应破产的储蓄机构没有及时被破产,最终导致了公共资金更大的损失。关于美国储蓄危机的发展和法律变革,参见M. S. Tammen, “The Saving and Loan Crisis: Which Train Derailed-Regula-tion or Deposit Insurance?”(1990) 6 Journal of Law and Politics 311,319。
[51]G. J. Beston&G. G. Kaufman, “FDICIA after Five Years”(1997) 11 (3) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 150.
[52]Hinder v. FDIC 137 F. 3d 148(1998);Franklin Savings Association v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision 934 F. 2d 1127(10th Cir 1991);Howell v. FDIC, 986 F. 2d 569 574(1st Cir. 1993 );Maccarthy v. FDIC 348 F. 3d 1075(9th Cir 2003):Golden Pacific Bank Corp. v. FDIC,375 F. 3d 196 (2d Cir. 2004).
[53]关于英国2009年前的银行管理制度,参见A. Campbell & P. Cartwright, Banks in Crisis: The Legal Response, pp. 120 -145。
[54]相关机构主要是指监管机构,英格兰银行和财政部,某一机构申请破产令应当取得另外一个机构的同意。2009年《银行法》第141条规定法院任命银行临时管理人。
[55]下列国家在其立法中给予了金融监管机构法定的保护:英国、美国、德国、澳大利亚、新加坡、南非等。参见R. S.Delston, Statutory Protection for Banking Supervisors,(1999) World Bank Financial Sector Website Paper No.4,http : /www1. worldbank. org/finance/html/statutory_protection. html,访问时间:2013年3月5日。
[56]IMF, An Overview of the Legal, Institutional, and Regulatory Framework for Bank Insolvency, p. 12.
[57]IMF, An Overview of the Legal, Institutional, and Regulatory Framework for Bank Insolvency, p. 12.
[58]Shelagh Heffernan, Modern Banking in Theory and Practice, John Wiley, 1996, p. 309;BIS, Bank Failure in Mature Econ-omies(2004),Working Paper No. 13. http://www. bis. org/publ/bcbs_wp13. pdf,访问时间:2013年3月5日。
出处:《环球法律评论》2013年第2期
作者单位:中国人民大学法学院
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